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ART. 1. — *A Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament.* BY EDWARD ROBINSON, D.D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary at New York. A New Edition, revised and in great part rewritten. New York : Harper & Brothers. 1850. 8vo. pp. 803.

IN no department of sacred or profane literature has there been so great improvement, in recent times, as in lexicography and grammar. It would be impossible to communicate an adequate idea of this to any reader, who was not practically acquainted with the older lexicons and grammars, before he used the recent ones. The philosophy of language is now so much better understood than it was a half century ago, as to lay the foundation for important improvements, not only in the manner and method of representation, but in the development of the forms of words, of the nicer significations dependent on these forms, and of the syntax or manner and order of combining words in a sentence. On these, every thing depends in enucleating the meaning of any language ; and cases of real difficulty can hardly be met in an adequate manner, without an accurate knowledge of the minutiae of both the grammar and lexicography of the language which one undertakes to interpret. Now and then, the solution of a difficulty depends on the knowledge of antiquities and of historical facts, and without such knowledge, no satisfactory ex-

planation, in such cases, is feasible. Hence the appellation of *historico-grammatical interpretation* is given to the now generally admitted and established rules of exegesis.

In studying a dead language, we first of all resort to a lexicon for the meaning of each particular word ; and then we must consult the grammar, in order to find out what modifications of sense and expressions of relation are designated by the various forms of words, whether verbs or nouns, and finally, to determine the manner in which the words of every sentence may or must be arranged. We cannot make an inch of headway without going through all this process. The first part, the consultation of a lexicon, every one spontaneously feels to be necessary. But the other parts of the work are not less so. Take, for example, the very first verse in the Bible, which in Hebrew runs thus : "*In the beginning, created God the heavens and the earth.*" Now in English, the unlearned reader, at least, might be puzzled to know, when he first perused this sentence, whether it means to say that *the heavens created God*, or *God created the heavens*. In English, which is literal (if we may so speak) in respect to the *order* of words as well as to their signification, the sentence is, at least in appearance, equivocal ; and the predominant construction in such a case, drawn from analogy in our language, would be that in which the *accusative* case immediately follows the verb. A reader of the Bible in general would indeed know, that such a method of interpretation here would contradict the tenor of the Scriptures, and make little less than nonsense. But if we should take a reader who knew nothing of the Bible, and direct him to the sentence in question, arranged in the Hebrew manner, he must be greatly puzzled, if not misled. Yet in Hebrew, all is plain and lucid. The Hebrews more commonly put the subject of a sentence *after* the main verb, unless some special emphasis on it were intended, and then it was placed *before* the verb. In the present case, the emphasis lies on the verb *created*, because the sequel exhibits a history of the *creation*. And then, before the word *heavens*, the Hebrew here places a particle, (נִסְּ) which is used to mark the accusative in any case, where doubt might arise. The Hebrew, then, is clear as the light. But suppose a person were to read this verse by the help of his lexicon only, and knew nothing

of the accustomed method of the Hebrew in regard to the position of the nominative, and nothing of the proper definitive power of the particle in syntax ; how could he satisfy himself of the meaning of the verse, unless, indeed, he might do it by a subsequent perusal of the context ?

This is only one of the thousands of like cases that occur, both in Hebrew and Greek. In the latter language, however, the accusative is marked (neuter nouns and adjectives excepted) by the manner in which the word terminates. But in Hebrew, as in English, some cases are not marked by their terminations. The reader is obliged, therefore, to resort to other means, in order to distinguish the nominative and accusative, or subject and object. Prepositions come to our aid here in English, for the most part ; but in the Hebrew, there are cases almost without number, where the accusative of time, of manner, of means, etc., has neither ending nor particle to distinguish it from the nominative. Other means than those of forms, or even of syntax, must often be resorted to here. They belong to, or consist in, the diacritical knowledge of the interpreter ; for without this, he could effect nothing satisfactory.

It is in relation to such subjects as the preceding remarks bring to view, that most of the modern advances in grammar and lexicography have taken place. Not many new meanings of words have been discovered, nor have many principles of forms or syntax absolutely new been developed. But where confusion once reigned, order is now introduced ; where a miscellaneous list of facts was once exhibited, regular sequency, dependence, and connection are orderly presented ; where examples or satisfactory proof of this portion of syntax or of that, of this meaning or of that, were once wanting, the lack has for the most part been supplied. All the stores of antiquity have been ransacked, in order to find material for filling out and perfecting both grammars and lexicons. Etymology has been immeasurably advanced. The languages, not only of the Semitic tribes, but of the remotest East, the Zend, and its eldest daughter, the Sanscrit, have been somewhat thoroughly explored, and there have been found abundant affinities in them with Greek and Latin, and with most of the European languages, which have received the new name of *Indo-European* languages.

Besides the remarkable etymological researches after the *parent-roots* of words, the *philosophy* of language, both grammatically and lexically considered, has made advances never dreamed of by the older lexicographers and grammarians. That language affords abundant material to engage the attention of philosophical minds, must be evident to the mere tyro in the study of it. As Jerome said of the Scripture, "Although it has shoals in which the child may wade, it has depths in which the elephant may swim." Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that a person may attain a just estimate of this subject, without supposing him to become interested, and even enthusiastic, in the pursuit of it. For what is *language*? It is the external expression of the internal soul of man. Man is gifted with the power of forming words, a power at once astonishing in its exhibition and boundless in its extent, and one capable of infinite variegation in the manner of its exercise. Human language has, of course, enstamped upon it the history of man's thoughts, the picture of his mind. Had we the whole store of the words of any nation, and the means of getting at their true signification, we might congratulate ourselves on possessing immeasurably the most certain, extensive, and interesting history of that nation which could be written. There may be histories in abundance of all the external changes and commotions of that nation, of its extent, its power, its prosperity or adversity, its independence or subjection, its tumults within and the aggressions made upon it from without; and the accounts of all these may be even particular and abundant; but still there is only a partial anthropology here. The fate and fortune of a nation, its external or internal relations in a civil point of view, are by far the least interesting part of its history. It is the *soul*, the *mind*, which is the man, and not what he accomplishes by animal strength, nor even what is done in the way and for the sake of satisfying animal wants. Language is the development of the soul; it gives us at once a view of the *psychical* condition of any people. What did they think? how did they feel? in what way did they reason or persuade? in what light did they view things that are without or within? in what sciences did they make progress? what were their moral and intellectual sources of joy or of grief? what were their views of themselves in their then present condition, and

what their expectations in regard to the future? These and the like matters are all enstamped upon a language, in characters unmistakable and deeply impressed. *Words are signs of ideas*, whether written or spoken. When written, they are the visible signs or symbols of what passes in the interior man. They show us his course of thought and feeling and reasoning; they develop the objects which most excited and interested him; they show the degree of his culture and knowledge; they discover what passed within him in such a way, that we may see how high or low he stood in the scale of human intellect, and rational improvement and enjoyment. In a word, they are *the history of his soul*, just as the usual accounts of external events are the history (so to speak) of his body.

In languages where we have specimens of earlier and later writers, we can distinctly trace the history of progress in any nation. Any new art, science, or discovery, will introduce new words in order to designate things that are new. Look, for example, at the sciences of chemistry and geology, both scarcely a half century old, when considered as proper sciences; what an infinitude of new words have they demanded and occasioned! A future reader of English, in a distant land, when he comes down to our day, will discover at once when these sciences were introduced, and will argue the gradual progress of them, from the progress made in terminology. Just so of the past. When particular words, indicative of office, place, privilege, rank, science, art, and the like, begin to be employed, then began something new in respect to the objects themselves which are designated. Words are always formed for use, and either from necessity or convenience. No people lays up a store of them beforehand, ready for use when wanted. A critical philologist will find, then, in the language itself which he studies, the history of the culture and advance of any people; and he will be better able to tell us what they were as sentient and rational beings, by the study of their language, than by all the histories extant, written in the ordinary manner. No wonder that he who studies the true philosophy of language, in all its bearings on anthropology, or on the real development of man in the highest sense of this word, should become enthusiastic in the pursuit of this knowledge. We repeat it,

that there is more to be known of man as a rational, sentient, religious being, by the study of his language, than by all the external history in the world. Through that medium, we may look directly upon the very mind or soul of any people, and judge of them as to all their capacities and attainments.

Many causes have contributed to give impulse to the study of language, since the nineteenth century commenced. The better knowledge of the Zend and the Sanscrit, the deciphered hieroglyphics of Egypt, and more recently of those of ancient Persia, Media, and Assyria, — all contribute their share in diffusing abroad, among the lovers of knowledge, a deep interest in the study of the ancient tongues. Every month is now adding materials for reflection and philosophizing, not merely on the historical facts related, but on the cognate and congener parent-roots, in all these languages, as tending to establish a descent from one common stock.

With all this expansion of linguistic knowledge, have come great improvements in the exhibition of the forms and structures of words, and especially of the manner in which the secondary, tertiary, etc., significations of them came to be deduced from the original root. Grammars have been improved beyond any anticipated measure, not only in the classification and exhibition of the forms of words, but, most of all, in syntax. Compare, for example, the syntax in the older Greek grammars, with those of Matthiæ, Kühner, and others, or with Winer for the New Testament Greek ; and in Hebrew, compare Buxtorf's Hebrew grammar (a good book in its time) with Gesenius and Ewald. So as to Hebrew and Greek lexicons. Buxtorf made an excellent manual Hebrew lexicon for his time. Even now it is worthy of consultation. But what a distance there is between his work and that of the *Thesaurus* of Gesenius ! And so in Greek. Compare Schrevel or Hederic with Passow, Pape, Rost, and others, or with Liddell and Scott, as we now have them in the excellent edition of the Harpers, edited by that promising Greek aspirant, Prof. Drisler. How rude, how arbitrary, do many of the meanings of words appear, as exhibited by Schrevel and Hederic, in comparison with the same as exhibited in Passow, and in several of his successors and improvers ! In recent lexicography, the literal and ori-

ginal meaning, being ranged first in order, is regarded as the root and trunk of the tree. From this, branches shoot off, spreading out wide at times, and giving birth to other and subordinate, or secondary branches. Not unfrequently, several main branches spring out of a trunk, which still remains, even to the top of the tree, but diminished (as is natural) in size, and, it may be, varied in shape. But all the branches still cling to the trunk ; the main ones directly and immediately, the smaller ones mediately, and only by the aid of the larger. It is in respect to the beautiful proportions, connections, and mutual dependencies of the several parts of this tree, that the drawings of recent lexicographers excel. In Hederic and his compeers, we may find, perhaps, the trunk and every important limb belonging to the tree ; but they are *disjecta membra*. One limb is here and another there ; but where they once grew and were fitted on, we are not informed. As little do we know, why they are reckoned as belonging to this particular trunk or that, rather than to some other one. There they are, or may be ; but the *why* of this arrangement is a secret not communicated to the scholar. Very different is the tree, as portrayed by recent hands. There it stands, in comely form and proportion, every large limb shooting out naturally from the trunk, and every small limb pushing forth from its immediate parent, the larger one. The leaves of the tree even are not wanting ; for these are the passages quoted from the classics, and brought to illustrate and confirm the meaning given. What scholar has not heard of a *Greek tree* ? But this was made out, in days of yore, only from the derived tenses of verbs. But here is now a *lexical* as well as a grammatical tree, and far more comely and fruit-bearing than the other. Indeed, the theory of the *lexical tree* belongs to some of the most subtle and diacritical parts of the philosophy of language. Gesenius led the van in Hebrew ; Passow in Greek. Some of Passow's editors and emendators have done more than their master in giving finish to the lexical tree, and adorning it with comeliness as well as fruit. Who is to improve on Gesenius in Hebrew, remains yet to be seen. But there are Hebrew scholars now living, who are capable of doing this ; as the lexical remarks here and there in their commentaries abundantly show. However, the work is great and appalling to most men, especially when

otherwise busily engaged in teaching. But enthusiasm will doubtless accomplish it in due time.

In respect to Greek, there are many things still wanting in Passow, and even in his emendators, Liddell and Scott, who have done nobly in the way of improvement. But there yet remains much land to be possessed. We may appeal to the *verb*, for example, and to its different meanings, proximate and remote. We need still fuller accounts of its irregular forms; of the respective meanings of its voices; of its usable and unusable tenses or persons; of its synonymes or equivalents, (for who has done much to the purpose here?) of its construction before different prepositions, and how it modifies them, or is modified by them; how and why it comes to be connected with such prepositions; what modification is made by *compounding* the verb with such and such prepositions, and why; what cases it must govern, (so to speak,) and why it governs them; and what cases it cannot govern, and why. The subtle philosophy of grammar and lexical science, in pointing out the *why* and the *wherefore*, in respect to the nature of cases that follow, as founded both on the relations which they are designed to express, and on the nature of the action designated by the verb, should be brought fully into action here. As yet, we have all this only in an incipient state, in most lexicons. The student may be told that this verb governs the genitive or the dative, instead of the accusative; that another can take only the accusative; but the *why* is often, nay, usually, left in the dark.

Now our idea of a perfect lexicon is such, that we deem it not complete when it tells us merely of the various meanings of a verb, or has shown us how they are derived, and in what order. It should also tell us why a genitive, or dative, or accusative, must stand after it, and how the same verb may take different cases after it, and how and why the sense is modified when this is the case. The basis of syntax, the *reason* or *ground* of it, is what we desire; and not a mere assurance of the simple fact, that a verb governs such or such a case. *There is a reason in all things*, says the old proverb; and there is one, at any rate, in the syntax of Greek verbs, although few have thoroughly developed it.

When all this is done, and we have, moreover, the history of the use of the word in its different senses, in all the differ-

ent stages of the language, then we have fully and fairly a *lexical* account of the word in question. Let any one look at most of the lexicons, and see how far they come short of all this. But the *complete* work is one of time. Not one generation, or even one half century, can be expected to perfect it. Such a lexicon would be a large book, if fortified by examples; and yet, compression in such cases can be carried a great way. De Wette, Hitzig, and Knobel, are conspicuous examples of this, in some of the lexical passages in their commentaries.

In respect to **NOUNS**, the task of adequate exhibition is sometimes rendered very difficult, when they are the names of *things* entirely foreign to our times and country. We are persuaded that where any remains of such things have been found, and sketches of them made by skilful engravers, it will be found the easiest, best, and shortest course in the end, to have these sketches copied on a reduced scale, and inserted in the lexicon itself. Professor Smith's excellent book of Greek and Roman Antiquities shows what may be efficiently done here. In many cases, a sketch or outline view of the object named would save a large space now occupied by an attempted description, and give a far more correct and definite idea to the student. We cannot but hope soon to see every *Real-lexicon*, as the Germans call such, namely, every lexicon which describes *things* foreign and strange, furnished with such an auxiliary apparatus.

In regard to other nouns, significant of things not palpable and visible, but intellectual and speculative, there is sometimes serious difficulty in making out the *lexical tree*, of which we have spoken. A *genetic* account of each species of meaning, the proof of its legitimate descent, and from what family, are not always things obvious and ready at hand. It oftentimes needs a subtle, discriminating, well-exercised philological tact, to accomplish this in a satisfactory manner. Any thing short of this will be exposed to blunders. Open Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon, and inspect the Hebrew words that correspond to *heavens*, *Elohim* or *God*, *cherubim*, etc. Even good old Schleusner (peace to his memory and his ashes!) exhibits many an example of failure. Yes, peace to his ashes! we say again; for he was the harbinger of a brighter and better day for New Testament lexicography. "With all his faults,

we love him still ;” for under his guidance we made our *début* on the field of New Testament philology. We are sorry to learn, that his last years at Wittenberg were darkened by the dismantling of that university, where Luther was so long the presiding genius. To a friend of ours, not long before his death, he said with great feeling, in reference to the ancient university, then reduced to an academy of theology, *Fuit Ilium*. Yes, Ilium had been, and had produced many a Hector in the holy warfare of the Protestants with their persecutors. And something like what Luther did in matters of theology, Schleusner himself, neither a great theologian nor an acute philologist, lived to accomplish, in regard to a revolution in the lexical department of New Testament Greek. Many a hint has he given to show the way to travellers more sharp-sighted than himself, for which their debt of gratitude is due. Even his errors are admonitory, for they teach us how to shun them. But we are digressing.

We return to another branch of lexicography, in respect to the New Testament. We have said nothing yet respecting the **PARTICLES**, apparently, at first view, the most insignificant of all the ingredients which compose a language, but in reality the most difficult, the most subtle, and in some respects, (especially as regards the *logic* and *rhetoric* of discourse,) the most important and controlling of all. What a wilderness do we descry the moment that we look into the old lexicons and search out these ! Rather, we might almost say, what a desert ! Some obvious and leading significations, of course, are given. But beyond that, what have we ? The multitude of tints and hues which many of them give to discourse ; the force and intensity, or the doubt and uncertainty in the speaker’s mind, which many of them designate ; the light and shade which they diffuse over a whole sentence or paragraph ; the logical connection of thought and reasoning which some of them point out ; the tone of moderated or impetuous assertion which others mark ; — these, and many more of the nicer qualities which the particles were designed to portray, are all but entirely wanting in the older lexicons. We have said that they are the most *difficult* part of language. It is quite true. They are the last thing that a Greek student fully attains ; certainly, the latest things to which the lexicons have in any good measure attained. It is no wonder. They seem,

at first, to be the most easy and obvious of words. So, in some of their primary meanings, most of them are. Hence they are not watched, nor their variations of meaning carefully noted. Every now and then, we find many of them introduced in particular passages, where they wear the air of intruders ; and here, instead of being pointed out, and duly defined in the lexicons, they are merely proscribed by a simple *pleonastice*, or *abundat*, or *expletive*. In other words, the writer, if we are to believe the lexicographer, has inserted a word without any meaning, or at most, a mere idle word. What is the admiring reader to do with his Plato, his Xenophon, his Homer, or his New Testament, when he is bid to regard the authors as using words without any meaning ? No ; this will never do. It may serve, perhaps, to veil the ignorance of the lexicographer ; but it does little to help the student. Rather must we say, it actually misleads him.

Particles are the very *joints* and *bands* of discourse ; or, to use other similes, they are the joints of a frame ; or they are the hinges on which gates and doors turn, and are opened or shut. Nothing can exceed the nicety and delicacy of shading which the Greek particles give to a picture. Put a tyro to reading Plato or Xenophon, those consummate masters of light and shade in a picture, and what idea does he get from one half of the particles with which he meets ? Just none at all. He must fall back upon the old solution (wrongly so called) of *abundat*, *expletivum est*. Put Schleiermacher, or Herder, or Lobeck, or Stalbaum, or Porson, to read the same passages ; and do they find any *superfluity* of words, in these renowned masters of language and æsthetical coloring ? No ; every word adds a new tint, or softens some one which seemed to be too strong. All the emotions of their minds, their clear convictions, their doubts, their assumptions, their assertions, their designed conditionalities, their hesitation, their higher or lower persuasion, even their hopes or their fears, are all made out more or less by throwing in particles of different kinds, adapted to all the various designs of the discourse. They are like the different colors on a painter's pallet, now communicating one tint, now another. Sometimes, too, they give a mingled tint, by being combined ; and may be compared to the effect of a meeting of colors in the rainbow. In the hands of such painters as Plato and Xeno-

phon, they adorn, and vivify, and qualify, and mitigate, and strengthen, and render prominent, the pictures which they help to draw. A man who understands not their use well, may attain indeed to the substantial meaning of a Greek sentence, in either of these or of the like authors ; but all the delicate tints of light and shade, of strength and beauty, are beyond his reach. They are a picture put before the eyes of one who has no power of vision.

Little, indeed, did lexicographers in days of yore think of these matters, and still less have they done to make them plain to others. Yet blunders here are sometimes of more serious importance than the mere loss occasioned by want of power to see light and shade. What if we are told to render a *causal* or an *illative* particle, in reasoning, by a particle not relating at all to such a connection? For example, good old Schleusner tells us, that γάρ sometimes means *nempe*, sometimes *autem*, *vero*, and sometimes *sane*, *profecto* ; and then, to conclude the matter, γάρ is sometimes merely *completiva*, and sometimes *redundat*. Can we well believe, that a *causal* particle, which stands before the reason or ground of a thing, can assume phases so diverse, not to say opposite? It is true, indeed, that, in the passages to which he appeals in proof of all this, the particles which he gives as the proper translation would agree in the mind with a good sense of the passage ; but the question is not, whether this may be true, but whether the writer did not give the sentence a different shape or coloring in his own mind. Philology, as it now is, would say, *Yes, he did*. And as to the *completiva* and the *redundat*, it would turn away with a feeling little short of scorn.

Such are and have been the difficulties, and the efforts to overcome them, on the part of grammarians and lexicographers. But of late, many monographs and even volumes on all the leading particles have been written by the hands of masters ; and although all has not been done that should be done, we are at least on the high road to other discoveries. In due time they will come. But let us remember, that we are at present no travellers on a railroad, in order to reach the land of discovery. *Slow and sure* is a better mode of travelling in this region. Still, we can easily find adventurers who have made haste ; and we cannot dismiss this theme about the *particles* without a glance at some of their efforts.

Let us take, as an example comparatively recent, the venerable Schleusner, who has already been mentioned. What says he on *Kai*? He gives us no less than thirty-two different meanings, and then adds, *interdum abundat*, in the thirty-third place, and in the thirty-fourth, *deficit interdum*. Finally, he adds, *Restant aliæ significationes*, which he goes on to give to the number of *six*, averring that nearly all interpreters admit them. Among these are *aliquando*, *cum*, *quamdiu*, *quanto magis*. What else now is this, but *deducere aliquid ex aliquo*? Even the tyro, at the present time, can see this to be preposterous. We shall attempt, however, no minute examination or refutation of such an extravagance. Hear that acute and excellent philologist and grammarian, Prof. Winer. "*Kai*," says he, (Gramm. § 57, 2,) "has only *two* leading primary ideas, *and* and *also*, both comprised in the Latin *et*." In other words, (a little different and more exact,) *Kai* is both a *conjunction* and an *intensive adverb*. In the latter case, being *adverbial*, it corresponds to our *even*, or *and indeed*, and sometimes is untranslatable, as in questions and commands. By usage, however, it gives intensity to them; a similar practice we can discern occasionally, in our own language. One person is telling another, for example, of a peril into which a mutual friend had fallen. The other interrupts him, and says, *And what did he do*? Is not this of quite a different shade and complexion from the simple and nude, *What did he do*? Every one feels it to be so, although he may not be able to describe the difference. So, too, in *imperative* sentences; for example, *Kai moi δὲς τὴν χεῖρα*, literally, *and give me your hand*. But this does not translate the expression, in accordance with the true spirit of the Greek. This implies that preceding words or actions are in view, and the *Kai* makes the phrase mean as much as we should mean by saying, *In connection with this matter, give me your hand*. But the energetic power evaporates in the English. *Kai* marks the connection and rapid succession, and also the animation, of the command. How difficult it is to translate all this, every scholar must of course know. In the New Testament, this *imperative* use of *Kai* is not much developed. But it is quite common in the classics. We approach near to it when we say, *give me your hand now*, or *give me your hand then*. With pronouns, the use is more simple, as *καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐστέ σοφοί*,

that is, *even you are wise*. Different would be the meaning in *αὐτοὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς εἰσὶ σοφοί*, *they and you are wise*. In the first place, *Καί* is an adverb; in the second, a mere conjunctive. Under the *adverbial* genus, many shades or species of translation can and must be given, according to the nature of the context; and this is allowable, because *Καί* as an adverb, has the *generic* nature of an *intensive*, and this, of course, comprises several species. In the admirable lexical article on *Καί*, which Kühner has given in his large Grammar, these are finely developed. His results are, *gar, sogar, noch; ganz, recht, schon, auch schon; noch, auch noch, auch nur*. The German goes so far beyond us in the richness of its *qualifying* and *intensifying* apparatus, that we will not hazard the attempt to translate all these words into English.

One thing more must be noted. This is, that in the New Testament Greek, *καί* not unfrequently answers to the Hebrew ו , in its peculiar meanings. Nothing was more natural than this, in a Hebrew-Greek writer. If the classical *καί* corresponded to the Hebrew ו in nine cases out of ten, it was nearly a matter of course for a Hebrew, who wrote Greek, to use it as corresponding to the tenth. And so we have it in the New Testament; for example, *καί, and so, and thus, and then, and yet, and still*. So *καί* often stands before the *apodosis* of a sentence, like the Hebrew ו , in which case it may be rendered *then, and then, and therefore*, etc., according to the nature of the sense required. Nothing can be plainer than that Schleusner, and even Wahl and Bretschneider, as exhibited in their respective lexicons, were at best but little acquainted with Hebrew. They rarely bring it to bear on the matter before them, except as to particular and peculiar phrases; and when they do, *aliquando bonus dormitat*. Yet all of these writers hold Hebrew knowledge to be indispensable to the interpretation of the New Testament Greek; while they have profited but very moderately by it.

But we find ourselves writing a lexicon instead of merely criticizing one. Our apology is, that we cannot criticize to any good purpose here, without showing *what* ought to be done, and *how* it should be done; and we can duly illustrate our meaning only by some examples. But enough of these for the present. There would be no end, if we examined all cases, or even those of importance. What we have said of

Kat, may be said, for substance, of many of the leading particles. There is either a nude skeleton, as in the older lexicons; or, when criticism had leaped over to the opposite extreme, there is an absolute plethora, — an image of Titanian magnitude, and with as many hands as Briareus. In the times of this opposite extreme Schleusner lived, and his lexicon partakes of the extravagance of those times. But it is the result of long, patient, and severe study; it embodies much that is contained in the best of the older commentaries; as a *Real-lexicon*, it has many good points; and as a faithful exhibition, with vouchers, of the meaning of words, in most cases, it is a safe and commodious guide. But as a *grammatical critic*, Schleusner has very moderate pretensions. When he wrote, grammar was just beginning to awake to new life, and to shake off the dust of ages. The art of lexical criticism was also in its minority, as any one may see, who consults the works of Pasor, Dieteric, Mintert, Leigh, Stock, Schwarz, Schoettgen, Krebs, and Parkhurst. In Schleusner, we see the transition state from the old *régime* to the new. His work is a great improvement on prior works of this nature. But we also may now say, *fuit Ilium*. His lexicon is, at present, almost one of the things that belong to the history of the past, like the works of Schrevel and Hederic. Lexicography, since his time, has become a *science*; one that has been fostered and adorned by some of the most acute minds in philological discriminations. It has its metes and bounds, as truly as hermeneutics. Indeed, the two sciences must go hand in hand, in order to reach the goal destined for both.

Wahl saw the defects of Schleusner, and attempted to remedy them. He brought to the task a good acquaintance with the Greek classics, and very considerable experience in the interpretation of Scripture. His work made a good degree of impression on the German public, and was received with so much favor as to go through repeated editions; the last of them, as we believe, (for we have not the work at hand,) in a condensed form, and in several respects improved. It was his lexicon, published a little before 1825, which was translated, with some additions, by Dr. Robinson, and published in the year just named. Wahl was not remarkable for special talents or acquisitions of the highest

order. He was diligent, even somewhat plodding, and not destitute of philological tact; but his *lexical-trees* sometimes look like our Lombardy poplars. The taste, the acumen, the philosophy, necessary to construct them and render them comely and well-proportioned, were not in him, and he could not command them at his will. He has all becoming *Dutch diligence*, wonderful patience in chase of *minutiæ*, and, in not a few cases, he makes distinctions not founded on differences, and differences not founded on distinctions, in the Greek text. One most important qualification was lacking, namely, — a deep and radical knowledge of the Old Testament idiom and language. It is in vain to think of reaching the summit of New Testament lexicography, without a radical knowledge of the Old Testament idiom.

Contemporary with Wahl, and independent of his work, was the New Testament lexicon of C. G. Bretschneider, published in 1824. It is of about the same size as that of Wahl, that is, two moderate volumes octavo. It is the work of a man of distinguished talent and powerful mind, who, had he been bred to philology, would doubtless have made distinguished proficiency in it. But the author had a system of Theology, and other works, in hand, and had little leisure to pursue critical linguistic studies with all his might. Still he has shown, under these embarrassments, not a little of industry, and also of tact. His work is not a mere compilation. He has paid much attention to the Septuagint Greek, to the writings of Josephus, and to all the earlier pseudepigraphs of the New or Old Testament, which are written in Greek. Philo, and the early Greek fathers, too, have not been altogether neglected. In this way, he has added something to the material for illustration and confirmation, which may be drawn from Hebrew-Greek writings composed a little before and after the time when the New Testament was written. For strength and clearness of conception, for logical power and discriminating acumen, Bretschneider has been highly distinguished in many of his works; and even in his lexicon these qualities are very apparent. Yet he had too many things to do, to permit him to steep himself in the idioms of either Testament; and sometimes he decides more as a psychologist, or a metaphysician, than as a philologist. But he has no little tact at exegesis, in consequence of his acumen

in discerning the logical sequency of a discourse. His work has been reprinted, we believe, more than once, and had he devoted to it as much time and patience as Wahl did to his, there can be no doubt that he would have carried away the palm from his contemporary. But he became engaged, at last, bitterly engaged, in controversy about neology, having become a convert to it in his old age, and writing even romances in its defence. In the mean time, the lexicon was left to shift for itself. In regard to its present repute, and the rank now assigned to it among the Germans, we possess no satisfactory information. We can say, however, from experience, that this lexicon will rarely fail to repay the student for consulting it.

In 1836, Dr. Robinson published his own New Testament lexicon, on which he had bestowed several years of labor. It is sufficient here to say of this, that three rival editions of it were speedily published in Great Britain, and subsequently two abridgments of it. The new edition, whose title stands at the head of this article, is the fruit of three more years' labor, in the best part of his life, and at the period of his full maturity. The helps which were now at his command, were of the highest order and importance. Wahl's and Bretschneider's lexicons had been republished with improvements. Winer had made many additions to his grammar; and Passow had been republished under the care of able successors, not to mention Pape and other Greek lexicographers. Liddell and Scott had issued their noble work; and, in commentary, De Wette, Meyer, and others had written distinguished works. Dr. Robinson, moreover, had himself been engaged in the daily explanation of the New Testament, for more than ten years. He had visited the lands of the Bible in person, and given to the world the only classical book on the subject of Palestine-topography, since the days of Adrian Reland; and a better one than even his. Besides all this, he came to his task furnished with a scholarlike knowledge of the ancient Greek classics; and, what is even more than this, in such an undertaking as his, he had enjoyed the best opportunities, in translating and publishing the Hebrew lexicon of Gesenius, to become extensively and accurately acquainted with the original Hebrew language. We must add to this, an almost vernacular knowledge of the German,

while a familiar acquaintance with the French, Arabic, Chaldee, and Syriac, had been a portion of his pastime. In short, it seems to us that he possessed all the keys of knowledge in relation to the treasures which were to be described and defined. Long practice in the exegesis of both Testaments had led him to the attentive study of all idiomatic and difficult passages; and his familiar acquaintance with Hebrew, Greek, and Roman antiquities and history, of course opened to him all the sources from which testimony or aid was to be drawn. Last of all, his unquenchable thirst for knowledge, his iron diligence, his firm and unalterable perseverance, and his sound judgment and discrimination, not only give him an unusual power of accomplishing, but of accomplishing in an able and satisfactory manner.

It is no wonder, then, that he has given us an excellent work, after laboring so long upon it, and with such ardor. He seems to unite the persevering enthusiasm of the Germans (among whom he has lived for several years) with the sobriety and sound judgment of the Englishman. We have sometimes wondered at the patience of the man, when we have read some of his articles, where a countless host of testimonies are appealed to, every one of which had been inspected and examined by him in its original source. When we examine these, we are led to give full assent to Scaliger, who said that "a part of the daily prayer of every literary man should be thanksgiving to God, that he had been pleased to make lexicographers and grammarians." Most persons, we well know, regard such studies as repulsive, and wonder at them. But we have seen, if not felt, that they may come to possess the highest degree of interest. Dr. Johnson, our English corypheus in lexical matters, did indeed perform much labor in his way; but not, it seems, with much loving attachment. Every one is familiar with his contemptuous and taunting definition of a lexicographer, namely, *a harmless drudge*. It was the *drudge* part which exasperated him; for he loved rioting in books, much better than the laborious making of them. Not so a real philologist. We shall hear from him no whinings about the disgusting tedium of his labors; no complaints of haughty neglect and disdain shown by those who wore coronets. Listen to Passow, the great reformer in recent Greek lexicography: "When I fall upon

the half complaining, half boasting passages in the prefaces to many lexicons, and light everywhere in them upon expressions of sore vexation, disgust, and abhorrence, even so that I can in no way imagine what has chained these groaning sufferers so long to the hated row-benches of the galley, I know not whether I shall find credence, when I assure the reader, that the rich, the endlessly manifold, and the ever new occupations of the mind, which this branch of philological study affords me, have rewarded me superabundantly for all my toil ; without which consciousness, no earnest efforts to enlarge our scientific knowledge are possible." *Pref. to edit.* 1825. In another place, he says : " It is common for the writers of dictionaries to complain of their tedious, protracted, hateful toil, in order, as it would seem, to set off their pre-eminent regard for the public, in submitting to be drudges so long for their profit. One would think, that the best way to recommend a book to the reader, is not to tell him that every line in it was written with disgust and abhorrence. What sort of a recommendation is this ? I have no such story to tell. On the contrary, I have labored more than twenty years on this work, and instead of being stretched on the rack all that time, I have been only swimming in an ocean of pleasure." Nobly said, and no doubt truly too ! *Salve, pater lexicographorum ! Salve ! Bene tibi et faustum sit, in paradiso lexicali !* This, in our view, is worth a thousand times more than all the groans, or whimperings, or outcries, of the great English lexicographer.

Dr. Robinson, as we opine, is much more nearly related to Passow than to Johnson. His work is clearly done *con amore*. No feeling short of this could have gone through such a labor.

This journal is not an appropriate place to go into any detail, with respect to many leading and highly important words in this new lexicon. A classical journal is the only appropriate place for such details. We can more usefully occupy the space allotted us, in giving our readers a brief view of some of the special difficulties that lie in the way of New Testament lexicography. They will then be better able to appreciate the labor that must be bestowed on such a production, in order to render it truly valuable.

Let it be remembered, that the ground-principle of all true

lexicography and interpretation is, that *a word means what the writer intended to designate by it*. The ground is here assumed, that every serious writer designs to be *understood* by his readers. Of course, he employs words according to their meaning as used by those for whom he writes. This is indispensable, in order to be rightly understood.

In such a case, where a writer employs his vernacular tongue, and belongs to the people whom he addresses, and is conversant, of course, with all the objects and manners and customs of that people, he finds no serious difficulty. His words merely suggest to the minds of his readers ideas with which they are familiar; and they, of course, readily understand the ideas and conceptions of the writer. So was it when a heathen Greek wrote for heathen Greeks; and so is it, when a native Englishman writes for Englishmen.

Very different from this is the state of the New Testament writings. Here two difficulties are presented at the threshold. First, the writer is a native Hebrew, and his vernacular is the later Hebrew. Secondly, he addresses, in the *Greek* language, men who are or were heathen, and whose former circle of thought, and knowledge, and language, was altogether Greek or heathen. In so doing, he endeavors to bring before them new objects and new doctrines or truths; and he also exhibits new modes of treating them, and of impressing them on his readers. By his Hebrew origin, a New Testament writer has become a Hebrew both in language and thought. When he undertakes to write in Greek, he necessarily brings along with him both Hebrew thoughts and idioms. These are foreign and strange to the heathen Greeks. And when he intermingles more or less of Hebrew idiom in his modes of expression in Greek, he is recognized at once as a foreigner, who has introduced into the vernacular Greek another element. This makes difficulty on the part both of writer and reader. *The language is a foreign one to the former; the things described are foreign to the latter.*

As we advance into this field and take a farther survey, we find our difficulties increasing. The Christian writer has a new revelation of pure and true religion to disclose, first of all to those who spoke the Greek, and afterwards, through them, to other nations. He has a religion to portray, which "had been hidden from ages and generations." And how can this be done?

No nation or people coin words before they are needed. There is no magazine or storehouse whence they are drawn on an exigency. The Greeks, who were polytheists and idolaters, spoke a language altogether appropriate to their religious condition and views. Their language of and by itself never designated, and, in fact, could not designate, any thing but ideas purely and merely heathen. But now a religion is to be disclosed, which, from its base to its topmost stone, so far as it is genuine and *distinctive* Christianity, is of a new material and new texture. Ideas must now be presented to heathen minds, to which they aforetime, and their language also, had been utter strangers. How could this be done?

Only in one of the following two ways. *The New Testament writers must either employ old words in a new sense, that is, one in a greater or less degree new, or else they must form new words.*

Of the latter we have but few examples, in comparison with the number of occasions for new words. Even these examples are not mere arbitrary formations, not new creations or productions of the locutive power in man. Nearly all such words are made by *composition*; that is, by uniting two or more original Greek words in one, in order to express ideas, or shades of ideas, which were unknown, or undesigned, in heathen Greek, or else to express ideas in a shorter or a more modified way, than that in which the classic Greek expressed them. For example: *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, *lowliness of mind*, *Christian humility*, which the Greeks not only did not express, but did not even recognize as a virtue. They called such a state of mind *pusillanimity*, and looked on it as opprobrious in any brave man. So *μακροθυμία*, *forbearance*, *long-suffering*; *μεγαλωσύνη*, *majesty*, especially *divine majesty*; and so in respect to some other like words. In regard to abridging and modifying words, the number of instances is not inconsiderable; for example, *ὀρθορίζειν*, *λιθοβολεῖν*, *ἀγαθοεργεῖν*, *μοσχοποιεῖν*; and so *ὑποπόδιον*, *χρυσοδακτύλιος*, *αἵματεκχυσία*, *ἄλλοτριος ἐπίσκοπος*, *μονόφθαλμος*, *καίλοποιεῖν*, *δικαιοκρισία*, and the like; a pretty full list of which may be seen in Winer's New Testament grammar.

Kindred to this was the formation of words in a manner either new, (although normal,) or else the employment of old forms, grown obsolete in common written Greek. Thus we

have as new forms, ὀπτασία for ὄψεις, συγκυρία for συγκύρησις, βασιλεσσα for βασιλεία, etc.; and as examples of rare and uncommon words, not usually employed in the later classic Greek, ἀθθεντεῖν *to govern*, μεσονύκτιον *midnight*, ἀλάλητος *unspeakable*, βρέχειν *to irrigate*, and the like; (see Winer, *ut supra*, § 2.) Both of these latter classes spring not from absolute necessity, but from the conceptions of those to whom Greek was a foreign language, and to whom, also, little knowledge of it belonged, (the case of Paul excepted,) saving that imparted by the *conversation dialect*. No doubt, many such words belonged to the vulgar spoken language, which are not recorded in the Greek books that have come down to us. Had we all the works of Aristophanes, our stores of popular diction would, through his comic dialogues, doubtless be much enlarged. We incline to believe, that in both these cases, the New Testament writers owe the forms of most such words to the *popular* Greek with which they were acquainted. But however that may be, it is undoubtedly true, that in all such cases as are concerned only with *varied forms*, there is little, if any, departure from the general sense of the classic forms. Such words can hardly come under our present category of *new formed words*; examples of which have already been given.

We stop not to inquire how it came about that the apostles took the liberty of forming new words, either by composition or in any other way. It lies on the very face of the matter, that in speaking of things entirely new to the Greeks, they must of necessity coin some new words. What could the chemist, or the botanist, or the zoölogist, or the geologist, of the present day, do without the liberty of forming and employing new words, appropriate to their respective sciences? But they might address the public as well, without using their *technics*, as the apostles could address the heathen Greeks on the subject of Christianity, without employing words necessary to designate new ideas.

But, secondly, *old words in a new sense* are the principal means employed in conveying new ideas to the Greeks. This is a principle admitted, and by necessity admitted, into all parts of the New Testament. It will strike almost with surprise any one not conversant with this matter, when he comes to be told of the extent to which this usage goes in the

New Testament. A little attention to the subject, however, will show, that nearly every thing peculiar and special in Christianity is designated by employing *old words in a new sense*.

Let us begin with $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, *God*, the fountain and object of all true religion. What is $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ in a Greek classic? A deified man, half human and half superhuman and monstrous, a compound of power, and pride, and cruelty, and ambition, and tyranny, and lust, a being fraught with all human passions, especially the baser or the more destructive ones; a being local, limited in power, subject to the destinies, and destitute of holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. If Plato and Socrates, and some few others, like Eschylus or Pindar, attained to higher and somewhat more spiritual views, these had little or nothing to do with the mass. The gods of Homer's Iliad are those of the populace. And these, with the exception of *supremacy* in Jupiter alone, have not one moral or physiological quality of the God of the New Testament. They are neither omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, eternal, or self-existent; they are not endowed with proper creative power; they are neither holy, nor just, nor all-wise, nor good. They are not even spiritual or incorporeal, but are formed of a kind of sublimated or transcendental substance. When, therefore, a New Testament writer appeals to the God of the Christians, or introduces him into any description or assertion, what idea could a heathen Greek affix in common with him to the word $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$? Not one thing is common to their minds, when this word is first introduced and read, excepting that of sovereignty or supreme power.

In what way, then, was the Greek to understand an apostle? In no way except by explanation, or by what is said respecting God in the context, and in other parts of Scripture. In these two ways, all knowledge of the apostles' meaning must be acquired. Rarely, if ever, do they stop to define words, for they take it for granted, the reader will sufficiently understand them by a diligent perusal of the context. In the present case, *supremacy* is the germ of the idea of $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$, and this is common to both parties; but the attributes and character of the Supreme Being are matters of inquiry, and of subsequent information to the Greek reader. Better was it to use this *germ* as a basis for development,

than to coin a word entirely new. Definition, immediate and formal, if it could be made, would not avail so effectually as further reading and consideration of the manner in which the Supreme is developed.

Having explained this leading word, designating the basis of all that is religious in the true sense, we may state the case of other leading and fundamental words in respect to the Christian religion more briefly. The Greek word ἄγγελος means simply a *messenger*; but in the New Testament this use of it occurs only some five or six times. The common use of it is to designate a purely spiritual subordinate being, (angel,) intermediate between God and man. Such are the *divine messengers*, in the view of the apostles; so that the accessory ideas attached to the word are two; first, that of a spiritual nature, and secondly, (in its common usage,) that of a holy being employed to execute divine commissions. To this whole order of beings the heathen Greeks were strangers. The true virtue of the word in the New Testament they were obliged to learn in the same way as that of θεός.

Then, again, we have *the devil's angels*. These are his *spiritual messengers to do evil*. Of such beings the Greeks knew nothing. Nay, the word διάβολος, *devil*, was, in their language, significant merely of a *calumniator*, who was not a spiritual or supernatural being. Of a spiritual enemy of God and man, a *primus inter pares* among evil angels or spirits, the Greeks had no idea. Their own gods were bad enough to furnish a satisfactory reason, by which one might account for all evil influences; and they never thought of such an order of beings as *evil angels*. They had indeed three *Furies*; but these were principally concerned with the infliction of madness and its consequences; and in general, their office was to be the ministers of the vengeance of the gods. Moreover, all of them were *females*; but we know of no distinction of sex among the biblical angels. Of course, a heathen Greek, in reading the New Testament, had to learn from the course of it what were the attributes and functions of the devil and all his angels.

Of the *spirits of the just made perfect*, the Greeks had no adequate or correct idea. *Holiness* was an attribute for which they had not even a proper name. The happiness of the *Christian heaven* was a thing of which they never

dreamed. Of a purely spiritual existence or being they had no conception. With them, *πνεῦμα* was *wind*, *air*, then *breath*, *respiration*, then (tropically) *spirited feeling*. Of proper spiritual beings even their philosophy had no conception. Their *ghosts* were merely of sublimated, airy, transcendental matter; and not unlike to this, were the forms of the gods themselves. All the happiness or sensations of their *Umbrae* were only airy and seeming things, without reality. Of course, every thing that pertained to the blessedness of the saints in heaven was utterly beyond their sphere of thought and language. All the New Testament ideas on these subjects they were obliged to learn *de novo*, from the various representations of that book.

Let us now go from personages to *places*. What was the Greek notion of *heaven*? In their language, *οὐρανός* meant *welkin* or *vaulted sky*. The edges of this vault rested on the verge of the earth; and through the centre of it, Mount Olympus shot up, and on its top, above the welkin, was the seat and heaven of the gods. In a more general sense, the word meant both the *air* and *sky*; but sometimes a particular region of the sky. But this was all. No great white throne; no angels or seraphim; no spirits of the just made perfect; no "waters of life;" no "trees whose leaves were for the healing of the nations;" no everlasting Sabbath; no songs of holy rapture. What an immeasurable distance lies between the two things! A converted Greek had to learn a new sense of the word *heaven*, as well as new views of those who dwelt there. The New Testament makes all this very plain.

As to the word *hell*, the heathen *ᾗδης* simply means *the invisible world*, *the grave*, *the infernal* or *lower regions*. In these were both good and bad. But the *γέεννα* of the New Testament is foreign to the Greeks. Dr. Robinson deduces, like most others, this word from the Hebrew *גֵּהֶנְנוּ* but the proparoxytone accent makes against this; and De Wette and Paulus (on Matt. 5: 22) are decidedly of opinion that it is of foreign origin. With their views we coincide; for we do not see how *om* is converted into the Greek *ai*. But be this as it may, the word stands for such a *hell* as the Greeks never dreamed of. They had to learn its meaning, as they learned that of the words named above.

Of *creation* as an act, that is, the bringing into being the material universe from nothing, no Greek dreamed. The words *κτίσις* and *κτίζω* had, in his mouth, a sense very diverse from that of the apostles.

So is it with *regeneration*. To be born of the Spirit, to be born of God, to be created anew in Christ Jesus, to be morally quickened or raised from spiritual death, were ideas as foreign to them in regard to the New Testament meaning, as the names of our technics in the recent arts would have been. All words employed to designate these things, as well as *sanctification* and *justification*, were employed by the apostles in a sense greatly diverse from that of the classic language. Even the word *ἅγιος* meant with them merely something devoted or consecrated to the gods. They had no *ἁγιότης* to designate *holiness*; and for the good reason, that they had never known or dreamed what *true Christian holiness* is. The readers of the New Testament found themselves called upon, therefore, to search out the new meanings of these words.

So is it with all the peculiar *Christian gifts* and *graces*. In classic Greek, *δικαιοσύνη* means *uprightness* merely; in the New Testament, in a multitude of cases, it designates the act or matter of *justification*, in the sense of acquittal or pardon. In classic Greek, *πίστις* means *trust* in others, *confidence*, or a means of *giving confidence* or *persuasion*; in the New Testament, there is mostly combined with this a special reliance on, or confidence in, the Lord Jesus Christ, as a *conditio sine qua non* of salvation. *Χάρις*, with the Greeks, meant *beauty of form, favor, kindness*; but Christianity has put a new emphasis on the word, when it speaks of the *saving grace* of God, and the *grace* of our Lord Jesus Christ. In short, there is no end to this catalogue of *modified* words and new senses affixed to them. Open the introduction to Winer's Grammar, and there may be found a great catalogue of them, which it is needless to repeat here. Enough has been said to make the reader fully aware on what new Greek ground he is treading, when he comes to the reading of the New Testament in the original.

We scruple not to lay down the broad position, that there is not a single important object, in heaven, earth, or hell, that belongs to the Christian system as such, which the

heathen Greek language, with its heathen meanings, could designate. The reason lies upon the surface. No language has words, which are the signs of ideas never entertained by those who use it. The heathen Greeks never had any ideas, either of objects, affections, or actions, appropriately and peculiarly *Christian*. How was it possible then to use their words, in their proper heathen senses, to designate things exclusively Christian? Nothing could be done, without giving a new sense to old words, or by the formation of new words. Any other way was plainly out of all question. Indeed, the thing is so plain that a very child can understand it.

Turn the tables for a moment. Suppose we were called upon to translate *guns, cannon, bombs, rockets, men-of-war, gunpowder, steamboat, electricity, magnetism*, and ten thousand other things, into Latin or Greek? Would not a Porson or a Hermann shrink at once from the attempt? The thing is impossible, simply because the Greeks and Romans, never having had any knowledge of these things, never formed any words to designate them.

Just so is it with Christianity. The heathen Greeks knew nothing of it, nothing of its special objects, operations, or graces. Of course, they never had formed any words, or used any words, to express these things. Inevitably, therefore, the apostles were obliged to do as they actually did; that is, to give new senses to old words, or to form in a normal manner new combinations of words, thus making essentially new words.

It lies on the very face of all this, that no apostle or evangelist could employ purely classical Greek in a classical way, in their communications. It is no good proof of Attic usage or style in the New Testament, that mere words found in Attic writers are found also in this book. *Θεός* is an Attic word; but how much of the Attic sense attached to the word belongs to the same word in Paul and John? We have already seen how this matter stands. *Style* is of course made up more of the *meaning* of words, than of their forms. But is there a paragraph in all the New Testament, which has not more or less words in it, that are employed in a sense different from that which the Attics attached to them? Certainly not one which treats of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.

This sole consideration, by the way, settles the great question, controverted in the fiercest manner among critics for more than a century, namely, — *whether the diction and style of the New Testament exhibit Attic purity*. Under the hands of some writers, it became an *articulus stantis vel cadentis ecclesiæ*. *Purism* was strongly contended for by Palairet, even so late as 1752. Salmasius wrote a book at an earlier period, which he entitled *Funus Lingue Hellenisticæ*, in which he maintained, that the doctrine of a Hellenistic or Hebraistic style in the New Testament was dead and buried, and he came forward merely to celebrate its funeral obsequies. *Sed tempora mutantur*. *Purism* has now been dead and buried just about a century.

It is amazing how such a dispute could ever have existed. Evidently the apostles could not communicate their views to heathen Greeks, without attaching new senses to old words, or else forming new words. This, of itself, shows that strict *Atticism* was abandoned, and that from pure necessity. No other resource for communication was left but this. And there is evidence of it in every paragraph of the New Testament. If the words are Attic in form, the meaning of very many of them is not so.

Then why contend for *Attic purity*? Had its defenders gained the victory, they would have settled the question forever, in the mind of every critical inquirer, concerning the *genuineness* of the New Testament books; that is, they would have proved that they were *not* written by Hebrews, but by native Greeks. Consequently, as the authors profess to be *Hebrews*, the books would thus be shown to be spurious. No Hebrew, above all, none who had learned any thing of the Greek except its conversation-dialect, could write in pure Attic without a miracle. Even miraculous aid given to the writer could not have enabled him to accomplish this; for the heathen Greek is a perfect stranger to many Hebrew ideas, and therefore could not, without such expedients as are described above, be a medium of communicating new ideas, or of designating new objects. Thus the Purists, in their jealousy for the honor of the New Testament style, elevated the book with one hand and threw it down with two.

Such are some of the extravagances to which superstitious criticism may lead even renowned scholars and masterly lin-

guists. All Europe was agitated for three generations by the controversy. It has now been dead and buried as many more. But there are other questions, about as important as this, and about as easy to be settled, that are still agitated. The *allegorical* and *double sense*, the *ὑποβολα* concealed under the plainest language is still defended; and we can hardly look forward to a time, when the extravagances of an Origen and a Cocceius will cease to find defenders. Such facts are replete with grave matter for the consideration of the Christian churches. They teach us how earnestly men may contend for things as important and even necessary, which, if they are established, can do nothing but mischief both to criticism and religion.

From the views now given, it is easy to see what a work a New Testament lexicographer has before him. Without a thorough and correct understanding of this whole matter, he can make no headway. He must falter and stumble at nearly every step. All the modifications which the designation of Christian ideas demands, in words that are Greek, must be described and defined by him. In order to make out these, the language and ideas of both the Greek and the Christian writers must be carefully compared. Dr. Robinson tells us, and no doubt truly, that this portion of his labor has cost him more time and toil than any other. (Preface, p. viii.) But he has done it to good purpose. Rarely will the reader find himself *sent to April* (as our cousins German say) when he consults him in respect to matters of this nature.

The work before us gives the etymology and original signification of each word. From the latter it deduces, in an orderly and logical manner, the derived or secondary meanings. The coloring given to words by their *adjuncts* is exhibited. In this way, the multiplicity of meanings in the word itself is very much diminished. Above all, regard is to be paid to this, in the case of verbs followed by prepositions, or of such as govern special cases. The derivations of forms, particularly of all irregular ones, is fully and accurately developed, as well as the distinctive and peculiar significations of different tenses and voices. As a specimen of patient, well-arranged, and accurate labor, one may consult *γίνομαι* or *ποιέω*.

In regard to nouns, the development often possesses a high

logical interest. For example, *δύναμις* is given, first generically, namely, — *ability, power, might, strength*. Then follow two classes of power: (1) Innate or inherent *power*, whether physical or moral. (a) *Strength* of body. (b) *Vigor* or *force* in various objects or agents. (c) *Power* of God or Christ. (d) Miraculous *power*. (e) Essential *efficiency*. (2) Outward *power*. (a) *Authority* or *sovereignty*. (b) *Power* as to quantity, in *abundance*. (c) Warlike or hostile *power*. All these are illustrated and confirmed, by quotations from, and references to, the New Testament, the Septuagint, the Hebrews, and the Greek classics, *pro re nata*. So the word *πνεῦμα* may be consulted, where will be found one of the highest and most protracted efforts of the lexicographer; which we cannot transfer here, for want of room. Other specimens may be found under *πίστις*, *δικαιοσύνη*, and *χάρις*.

We have already described the difficulty that attends a full and accurate development of the particles, and the importance of such a development. Accordingly, we should expect to find Dr. Robinson exercising his iron diligence here, and our expectations are fully answered. We cannot extract, but we refer for samples to *διά, ἐν, εἰς, κατά, παρά, πρός, σύν, δέ, μή, οὐ*, etc. The article *ὁ, ἡ, τό*, is one of the most labored in the book, and with much success.

All parts of the book which present words of any difficulty have received careful revision and correction. Some have been enlarged, others compressed. On the whole, the book contains a considerable number of pages less than the preceding edition of 1836. But the quantity of real matter is much greater. Skill in abridging and compressing, without any sacrifice of perspicuity, has effected this. Pascal's excuse to his friend, who chided him for writing so long a letter, namely, — that "he had not time to write a shorter one," contains a deal of truth. Nothing but thorough knowledge and strenuous effort can accomplish brevity and perspicuity united. Dr. Robinson might probably have made two volumes like Schleusner's, with less of effort, if not of time, than he has written one.

We must not omit to add, that every difficult passage of the New Testament is handled *exegetically*. The lexicon of words is at the same time a *thesaurus* of the best interpretations.

In addition to all the rest, the publishers have done their part nobly. Fine paper, superb type, both Greek and English, good ink, and a fine impression, constitute the beautiful costume of this work, so honorable to the author and his country. We are not fond of boasting; much less at the expense of the reputation of our venerable mother beyond the Atlantic. But we may, with all due respect, ask her, where are the New Testament lexicons of Oxford or of Cambridge, that will bear comparison with this? Greek scholars they have in abundance. They can lecture on Greek tragedies, and, it may be, on Greek historians, to some good purpose. But we are not aware of much which is important that has been done by them for a century past, in the way of promoting the true critical knowledge of the Scriptures. It would seem, that a large class of men, set apart for the service of the church and of sacred literature, and maintained at a most princely expense, ought to repay a munificent public by something that would keep adequate pace with the sacred philological progress of the present day. They have given us, indeed, a Parkhurst's Lexicon, and a Taber on the Prophecies, and a Birks on Daniel, and an Eliot on the Revelation, and some other productions of the like calibre and stamp. What real advances can a thousand such writers make, in solid, profitable, sacred literature?

One thing, however, they may do. As before, they may republish three or more editions of Dr. Robinson's work, besides several emasculated abridgments; and the first of these, even if the author is obliged to forego all remuneration, and has his own market straitened at home, we should be glad to see; for it would be the harbinger of a brighter day in sacred criticism among the English people. We hope the mother will not take offence at this freedom in her daughter, nor call to mind the days when this daughter was somewhat saucy and unmanageable. She has now grown to an age of some maturity, perhaps in judgment and learning, as well as in years, and can venture to speak a little more freely than in days that are past. But with all her pride and self-sufficiency and proneness to glorying, and with all her republicanism, too, she does boast, and will boast, and glory in it too, that she has the *noblest descent* of any nation on the face

of the whole earth. Let each provoke the other to love and good works ; and the further the rivalry goes, the better for themselves and the world at large.

Of course, a book like that of Dr. Robinson's, which comprises such an infinite variety of topics, philological, critical, exegetical, moral, and religious, must needs have some faults. In the many leading articles that we have examined, however, we have found none worth noting here. Undoubtedly, with respect to the exegesis of some passages, there is room for variety of opinion. We might not agree with Dr. Robinson, as to the turn given to this difficult text or to that. But he does not claim that we are bound to accord with him. He only claims the right of giving his own opinion, and generally with the reasons for it. When we differ, we are bound at least to thank him for giving us what is said and thought by others, or by himself ; and this is no unimportant service. He is no dogmatist ; nor is he of the *neuter gender* in philology, criticism, or theology, so far as the latter has to do with a lexicon. But his decisiveness makes him neither overbearing nor obstinate. Even in case we are compelled to differ from him in opinion, we are pleased to see that he has an opinion of his own. The *aspectus bifrons*, which we so often get sight of in Schleusner and Wahl, has no place here. The *Umhüllung* so often employed by them, in relation to certain topics and things, is never employed, or at least is successfully kept from view, by Dr. Robinson. We may differ from him without the fear of any forthcoming anathema. But thorough adepts in philology and exegesis will not often find occasion to differ ; and when they do, the case will be one on which something may be fairly said on both sides. Positiveness here would not be quite becoming.

What has been said above will serve, as we think, to convince every candid mind of the importance of a separate New Testament lexicon. How would it be possible, even in such an extended work as that of Liddell and Scott, to give all the light and shade of New Testament words ? Above all, how could a classical lexicographer afford room for biblical history, biography, geography, antiquities, and the like ; and especially, how could he make such a work a *thesaurus* of New Testament interpretations ? Hence the all but worthlessness of common lexicons, for a critical reader of the New

Testament Greek. What has been already said will show every one the reason and ground of this. But a lexicon like that before us will enable the student in a good measure to dispense with the commentators. Indeed, it is beyond comparison the best way of studying the New Testament, to confine one's self to a good grammar and lexicon, until all the light which these afford, and all which one's own reflections may supply, appear to be insufficient for satisfaction. But always let one's own efforts be exhausted, before he applies for aid, when he has time to devote himself to thorough study. Commentaries are made for exigencies, and to save time in case of pressure. He who means to stand on his own basis, must render himself as independent of them as he can. A deep study of idiom, in the way of using grammar and lexicon, is the high road, and the only one, to real independence. In due time, lexicon and grammar may be nearly dispensed with, and a good *concordance* will be worth all the lexicons in the world. It is one excellence of Dr. Robinson's book, that it serves nearly all the purposes of a concordance, as well as those of a lexicon.

We are somewhat apprehensive, that some readers of this journal may think so long a review of such a book is out of place here. But the importance of the subject, and of the principles which are discussed, will apologize, as we hope, for this length. At all events, we believe that a Christian public will not do otherwise than thank us for bringing before them the merits of a work adapted to afford most important aid in studying the original records of our faith. It is a book that all religious parties may use in common; and if they are not always guided by its decisions in certain cases, this will not hinder the profit resulting from the use of the book in general. It is not the work of a sectarian, but of a genuine philologist. We repeat, that it is an honor to our sacred literature and to our country.